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Abstract 
We show how consumers’ environmental concerns may limit ‘love of variety’ (LOV) and be 
reflected in consumers decisions. We investigate how the impact of environmental degradation 
on LOV influences demand and optimal product variety, and how a pollution tax on firms might 
be used to improve upon the market outcome and increase welfare.   
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1. Introduction  
In this paper, we modify the Dixit-Stiglitz framework of product differentiation to capture how 
environmental concerns can affect consumers’ decisions via their ‘love of variety’ (LOV). 
 In the theoretical literature, it is generally assumed that product-variety is limited by the 
supply-side whilst the potential demand for variety is unlimited. As a result, standard welfare 
analyses point to market outcomes being characterized by a sub-optimal (under-) provision of 
varieties.  However, if there are limits to LOV, the standard assumption may lead to an over-
production of varieties relative to what is socially optimum.  We contend that consumers’ 
environmental concerns may be one of the factors limiting LOV, since the effects of product 
variety on welfare may not be independent of these concerns. Specifically, we argue that – to the 
extent that (excessive) availability of varieties affects (or is perceived to affect) pollution – the 
disutility from environmental degradation may manifest itself via a lower enjoyment of variety.1  
We propose to incorporate this effect by augmenting the standard Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) utility 
with a LOV parameter2 that is a decreasing function of perceived environmental degradation. 
 One plausible implication of this modification is that the negative externality of pollution on 
consumers’ utility is reflected in their demand for goods. In this, we depart from most of the 
existing theoretical literature 3  in which, whilst reducing utility, environmental degradation 
(typically modelled as an additive argument in the utility function; see, e.g., Stokey, 1998) does 
not affect demand functions – unless it influences consumers’ budget constraints (e.g. via a tax).   
 We investigate how the impact of environmental degradation on LOV influences demand and 
optimal product variety, and how a pollution tax on firms might be used to improve upon the 
market outcome and increase welfare.   
 Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 discusses the sub-optimality of market equilibrium 
and explains the role of policy. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2. The model 
We consider a simple partial equilibrium monopolistic competition model with a mass N of 
symmetric firms. Each firm produces a variety indexed [0, ]i N∈  of a horizontally differentiated 
good.  Consumers’ demand for each variety i is assumed to be  
 1 ( )( ) E p iy i N
P P
σ
λ
−
− ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ,  (1) 
                                                 
1 For instance, consumers may be increasingly conscious of the wastage (e.g., due to unnecessary replacements and 
high levels of obsolete stocks) associated with excessive variety (Tang and Yam, 1996). Anecdotally, the popularity 
of locally produced organic ‘green grocery boxes’ in the UK may be indicative of a willingness to sacrifice access to 
the greater variety offered by supermarkets.    
2  See Benassy (1996), Molana and Montagna (2000) and Montagna (2001) for further discussion and some 
applications of this modification.  
3 For informative reviews of different aspects of the environmental economics literature see e.g. Copeland and 
Taylor (2004) and Lahiri and Ono (2007).  
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where E and P denote respectively the total expenditure and the price index for the differentiated 
good, ( )p i  is price of the variety, σ>1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties and 
0 1λ≤ ≤  is a parameter that captures the extent of LOV with λ=0 and λ=1 corresponding to the 
two extreme cases of ‘no love’ and ‘maximum love’. It can be shown that the above demand 
function is consistent with CES price and quantity indices 
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and the budget constraint 
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Using (1)-(3), we obtain  
 ED
P
= ,  (5) 
which provides a measure of indirect utility.  
 Consider a situation where the extent to which consumers derive utility from the availability 
of product variety is affected by the (perceived) degree of environmental degradation due to the 
production of these varieties. We propose to incorporate this effect by letting the LOV parameter 
λ be a decreasing function of perceived pollution. For simplicity, we assume, without loss of 
generality, that each firm releases a constant amount of pollution (i.e. a firm’s pollution is 
independent of its output level). Then, total pollution is proportional to the mass of firms N.4  
Hence, we let ( )Nλ λ=  with 0λ′ < .5  
 Note, from (2), that the price index P attaches a weight of  1N λ −  to each 1( )p i σ− . With a 
constant and positive λ, P has the usual Dixit-Stiglitz property of being monotonically 
decreasing in N.  The modification we propose, whereby consumers’ concern for the 
environment affects (through its impact on λ) the weight attached to 1( )p i σ− , changes the above 
monotonicity property. Specifically, it can be easily verified that P reaches a minimum and starts 
rising once N arrives at a certain threshold.  In turn, this implies that the indirect utility in (5) first 
                                                 
4 It is plausible to assume that – for given levels of pollution emission per unit of output – total environmental 
degradation is increasing in the number of firms (e.g. via extra production plants, land usage, etc). For simplicity, in 
this model we do not consider output-related pollution.  
5 We can assume without loss of generality that the domain of ( )Nλ  is bounded in [ , ]N N  with ( ) 1Nλ =  and 
( ) 0Nλ = .   
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increases and then falls in N. The intuition for this is that the direct effect of an increase in N is to 
reduce P and increase D (for a given λ). However, its indirect effect (via a reduction in λ, the 
extent to which consumers value extra variety) works towards an increase in P and a reduction in 
D. Thus, for a sufficiently small N, the net effect of an increase in N is to reduce P and increase 
utility: when N is small, the level of pollution is low and an expansion of product variety has the 
standard effect of increasing welfare. For a sufficiently large N, λ  is small and the net effect of 
an increase in N is to increase P and reduce utility since now the indirect effect on D via a fall in 
λ dominates.  
 It is worth noting that this modification does not change any of the standard properties of the 
original framework: at the level of the individual consumer, taking N and hence λ as given, 
duality holds in that both maximizing (3) subject to (4) for a given E and minimising (4) subject 
to (3) with a given D yield the same result, i.e. the demand function in (1). The main implications 
of the above modification becomes apparent when we consider the aggregate market equilibrium. 
3. Equilibrium and welfare analysis 
Assuming that the market for each variety clears, that the production technology is the same 
across firms, and that marginal costs are constant, the profit of the representative firm i is 
( )( ) ( ) ( )i p i y iπ β α= − − , where β and α are the firm’s marginal and fixed cost parameters, 
respectively.  Maximisation of profit subject to (1) yields the constant mark-up pricing rule   
 ( )
1 1/
p i p β σ= = − ,  (6) 
where p is the price of a variety under symmetry.  
 Allowing for the mass of firms N to be determined endogenously via free entry and exit, and 
using (6), the zero-profit condition ( ) 0iπ =  implies that each firm’s optimal output scale is   
 ( 1)( )y i y
p
α α σ
β β
−= = =− , (7) 
which is constant and the same for all firms (as in the standard CES monopolistic competition 
framework). These imply that the price index in (2) can be written as  
 ( ) /( 1)N
pP
N λ σ −
= , (2′) 
which, for a given p, yields an inverse-U-shaped relationship between P and N as long as 0λ′ <  
and 1.σ >  
 The market equilibrium condition, equating aggregate expenditure and revenue, implies 
 E Nασ= ,  (8) 
which, for any given α, σ and E, determines the equilibrium mass of firms. This solution for N 
does not necessarily coincide with the optimal mass of varieties, N*, that would maximise the 
indirect utility for a given E and hence satisfy dP/dN=0. We illustrate the main point in Figure 1 
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which depicts the demand and supply sides in ( ),N E  space. The demand side is illustrated by 
the inverse-U-shaped utility-indifference curves, *1 2, and D D D  which correspond to equation 
(5) for a given D and taking account of (2′), i.e. they are contours of /E P D=  and have the 
same functional properties as P; higher contours correspond to higher utility levels and all 
contours reach a minimum at the same N=N* which also minimises P. For any given level of 
aggregate expenditure (utility), maximum utility (minimum expenditure) is therefore achieved at 
N=N*.    
 The supply side, for a given and ,σ α  is shown by the line E Nασ=  which determines the 
mass of firms. With a predetermined aggregate expenditure, e.g. E=E1, the market equilibrium 
solution occurs at point A1 where the 1andN E E Eασ = =  lines intersect.    
 
 In partial equilibrium, and in the absence of any policy intervention, the level of utility 
(welfare) is determined by the highest possible utility-indifference curve that passes through A1, 
i.e. D1.  Because the E Nασ=  line slopes upwards, with no policy intervention the mass of 
firms determined by the market equilibrium always exceeds the utility maximising one, N*.  This 
would hold even in general equilibrium where aggregate expenditure E is endogenously 
determined. To verify this, note that (as long as and σ α  are fixed) the solution ought to satisfy 
,E Nασ=  hence the best possible outcome corresponds to that level of E at which the 
                         N*                N1                          N 
E1 
D1 
E = ασ N 
E 
A1
Figure 1: Market solution and the effect of optimal policy 
E =E1 
E = α∗σ N 
D* 
A*
D2 
A2
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E Nασ=  line is tangent to the highest possible indifference curve, shown by D2 at A2. In this 
sense, therefore, there is always an over-production of varieties.   
 Clearly, in such a situation there is a role for policy since an intervention can improve 
welfare by affecting the mass of varieties and the pollution level. In the simple framework of the 
above model, a social planner could impose a lump-sum pollution charge on each firm that, by 
increasing the fixed cost α,  would push the market outcome to coincide with the optimal number 
of varieties. The effect of this policy is shown in Figure 1 by the move from 
( ) ( )* *1 1 1 1,  at  to ,  at N E A N E A  which is achieved by raising the initial fixed cost * to α α ; 
*α α−  is the optimal lump-sum tax necessary to make the E Nασ=  line cross the E=E1 line at 
the point at which the latter is tangent to the highest possible indifference curve. This tax reduces 
the mass of firms to N* and cuts the pollution level below that implied by the market solution, 
thus increasing welfare. 
4.  Conclusions 
This paper modifies the CES Dixit-Stiglitz utility function to allow for consumers’ 
environmental concerns to affect their love of variety. We show that consumers’ awareness of 
the environmental impact of production can limit their demand for product variety and result in 
the market outcome being characterised by an overproduction of variety relative to what is 
socially optimal.  A lump-sum tax on firms is then shown to be effective in correcting the sub-
optimality of the market outcome by reducing entry of firms and limiting pollution.  
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